A Formal Framework for Deceptive Topic Planning in Information-Seeking Dialogues

Extended Abstract

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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a formal framework for goal-hiding information-seeking dialogues to deal with interactions where a seeker agent estimates a human respondent to not be willing to share the sought-for information. Hence, the seeker postpones (hides) a sensitive goal topic until the respondent is perceived willing to talk about it. This regards a type of deceptive strategy to withhold information, e.g., a sensitive question, that, in a given dialogue state, may be harmful to a respondent, e.g., by violating privacy. The framework uses Quantitative Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks to assign willingness scores to topics, inferred from a respondent’s asserted beliefs. A gradual semantics is introduced to handle changes in willingness scores based on relations among topics. The goal-hiding dialogue process is illustrated using an example inspired by primary healthcare nurses’ strategies for collecting sensitive health information from patients.

KEYWORDS
Formal dialogues; Formal argumentation; Knowledge extraction; Non-collaborative agents; Machine deception

1 INTRODUCTION
In the area of formal argumentation dialogues, an information-seeking dialogue [17] is commonly defined as an interaction between a seeker agent and a respondent agent. The seeker’s overall goal is to obtain a particular set of information, assumed to be possessed by the respondent, that the seeker cannot get access to through other means than by questioning the respondent. The respondent is commonly defined as being collaborative, and has the role of providing the sought for information by answering the seeker’s questions as clearly as possible. This paper is concerned with defining a class of formal information-seeking dialogues, referred to as Goal-Hiding Dialogues, between a software seeker agent and a human respondent agent, where it is assumed that the human respondent initially is unwilling (non-collaborative) to disclose the information that the seeker wants. The seeker aims to introduce its goal topics, while being constrained to only introduce topics for which the respondent has sufficient willingness. Thus, the seeker postpones its goal topics until the respondent is perceived to willingly talk about them.

There is a range of human settings where such dialogue strategies are present, such as criminal interrogations [9] and medical assessments [7], commonly involving sensitive information that can be difficult to talk about or to admit directly. A particular example is healthcare nurse and a patient, where building trust through a tacit order of topics is central for successfully collecting sensitive health information [1]. In order to approach sensitive topics, the nurses employ strategies such as being friendly and welcoming, and introducing lighter topics, to establish trust in the dialogue.

In the area of chatbots [5], topic selection and personalization of dialogues have been approached through various techniques from Natural Language Processing (NLP) [4, 6] and Machine Learning (ML) [10, 15, 16] to build response generation models, which have enabled systems that can understand and respond to user inputs in a conversational manner. However, these methods require large amounts of social conversation data [18], typically not available in settings where sensitive topics are discussed. In a goal-hiding dialogue, to proactively select topics, a software agent must consider a human’s dynamic willingness for topics. This requires a formalism that is non-monotonic w.r.t. the state of the dialogue.

A Quantitative Bipolar Argumentation Framework (QBAF) [3] is a tuple $(X, R^-, R^+, \tau)$ consisting of a finite set $X$ of arguments, a binary (attack) relation $R^-$ on $X$, a binary (support) relation $R^+$ on $X$ and a total function $\tau : X \to [0,1]$, returning the so-called base score of arguments. A total strength function $\delta : X \to [0,1]$ returns the so-called strength of arguments. By analyzing arguments’ support and attack relations, the strengths are adjusted by considering a gradual semantics. This paper proposes QBAFs for modeling a human agent’s willingness for topics. By applying QBAFs, a set of arguments $T$ represents topics, and a function $\delta : T \to [0,1]$ generates willingness scores for topics in a given dialogue state. A game strategic gradual semantics [2] is introduced to deal with changing willingness as new topics are opened in the dialogue. We assume a measure of willingness to be quantitative, on a finite willingness score between 0 and 1, and we assume willingness to be argumentative and bipolar since it can be based on topics that promote (support) or demote (attack) willingness of other topics. We introduce a method for analyzing a respondent’s asserted beliefs to construct a QBAF-based willingness model. By adapting the model to each dialogue-state, a seeker agent can strategically promote willingness for a goal topic before opening it in the conversation.
2 FORMAL FRAMEWORK

Goal-hiding information-seeking dialogues regard interactions as games between a seeker agent and a respondent agent. This is a process of collecting information/beliefs, where the seeker agent asks questions (topics) and the respondent replies by asserting beliefs (see Figure 1).

Let $U_a := U_a^r \cup U_a^b$ denote all possible utterances from agent $a$, where $U_a^r$ represents known topics, and $U_a^b$ represents known beliefs. The possible moves of a seeker agent $se$ are: $(se, open, t)$, $(se, close, t)$ where $t \in U_a^r$. The possible move of a respondent agent $re$ is: $(re, assert, b)$ where $b \in U_a^b$.

A dialogue $D^a$ is an ordered sequence of moves $[m_1, \ldots, m_n]$, where each move $m_i \in M_a$ for $a \in I$, and $r, n \in \mathbb{N}$. A well-formed goal-hiding information-seeking dialogue meets certain protocol conditions, including starting with an open move by the seeker followed by the respondent who asserts beliefs that are connected to the current topic. The information-seeking dialogue process ends when either the sought for information, beliefs related to the goal topic, has been asserted, or if the goal topic cannot be reached due to willingness being below a defined threshold.

Let $\gamma = (I, D^a, Q^a)$ be a goal-hiding information-seeking dialogue system such that $I = (se, re)$, is a set of agents, $se = (G, U_e, \delta, TS)$ is a seeker agent, $re = (U_e, BS)$ is a respondent agent, $g \in G$ is a goal topic, $\delta$ is a willingness strength function, and $Q^a = [q_1, \ldots, q_n]$ is a sequence of QBAF-based willingness models, one for each state of the dialogue $D^a$. A willingness model is defined as $q_i = (X_i, R_i^+, R_i^−, \tau_i)$ ($r \leq i \leq n$) where $X_i$ is a set of topics, $R_i^+$ is a set of attack relations, $R_i^−$ is a set of support relations, and $\tau_i$ returns willingness scores for each topic in the current state.

Relations between topics, in terms of promotion and demotion of willingness, may not be known initially. However, by analyzing the respondent’s asserted beliefs, these relations can be learned through interaction. This assumes that a respondent agent’s asserted belief $b \in U_a^b$ has a quantitative dependency $v \in [-1, 1]$ to at least one topic $t \in U_a^r$. Given a belief $b$ and the set of topics $U^r$, $dependent\_topics^v(b, U^r)$ and $dependent\_topics^+ (b, U^r)$ represent the set of topics that $b$ is negatively and positively dependent on, respectively. If a belief has dependencies to more than one topic, we say that there is a relation between the topics. Thus, we define a Belief-Topic Dependency Graph which links beliefs to topics, and indirectly infers relations (supports and attacks) between topics in a QBAF $q_i$ associated to the current dialogue state $d_i$ ($r \leq i \leq n$).

In order to keep focus in the dialogue, we define properties that must be preserved throughout the dialogue: Strength monotonicity states that the willingness for the goal topic, $w_i = \delta(g)$ w.r.t. $q_i$ ($r \leq i \leq n$), must not decrease from the previous state. This keeps the dialogue goal-oriented. In order to take a suitable path, Sensitivity interval constrains the seeker’s moves for opening topics. A topic $t$ can not be opened before its willingness score reaches the bounds of the sensitivity interval $[\rho^u, \rho^l]$, where $\rho^u \in [0, 1]$ is an upper bound and $\rho^l \in [0, 1]$ is a lower bound. Intuitively, the lower bound is a mechanism for respecting willingness, and the upper bound limits excessive promotion of topics.

Let us consider a software assistant (seeker agent) which joins a health-promotion dialogue [8] with an elderly individual (respondent agent) to facilitate sharing of (intimate) health related topics. The seeker is designed to conduct a goal-hiding information-seeking dialogue, inspired by dialogue strategies commonly used by primary healthcare nurses to postpone sensitive topics [8]. The seeker aims to introduce a topic $g$ (loneliness), typically being a difficult topic to discuss [12], assumed to be an undesired topic by the respondent ($m(g) < \rho^u$). Hence, the seeker postpones topic $g$, and begins with topic $c$ (grand children), currently assumed to be desired ($\rho^u > m(c) > \rho^l$). The seeker continuously infers new topic relations to estimate willingness, by considering asserted beliefs, and steers the conversation tactfully towards the goal.

3 CONCLUSION

Most formal dialogue solutions aim to find whether the agents can agree about statements under a specific topic, but finding the moment to switch intermediate topics in a dialogue is an open problem, which we target in this work. The proposed formal framework deals with strategic withholding of information that, given a context, may be harmful, e.g., by violating privacy. Goal-hiding is related to deceptive strategies [11, 13, 14], which brings ethical and theoretical challenges for future work; Can the same representation be applied to detect types of goal-hiding deception?
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REFERENCES